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opinion of Chief Justice Vinpon holding that state judicial enforce-
ment of restrictive agreements directed at Negroes is an unconstitu-
tional denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws. 2 As
succinctly stated by appellate Justice Edgerton, who dissented
in Mays v. Burgess 23 and in Hurd v. Hodge,24 "Restrictive covenants
are not self-executing."-' That what the state legislature is pro-
hibited from achieving openly should be accomplished through mdi-
vidually created but judicially enforced constrictions was a reflec-
tion upon the judicial system of the nation. In companion cases26
the Supreme Court, speaking again through the Chief Justice, held
that judicial enforcements of racial restrictions is improper when
undertaken by federal courts, for such enforcement is a denial of
rights intended by Congress to be protected by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and is contrary to the public policy of the United States.
Therefore, as a result of these decisions, judicial sanction of a dis-
crimiatory device, the use of which has subjected the nation to
criticism both'at home and abroad, has finally been withdrawn.
Robert J Lynn
Enforcement of Submission Agreements
The significance of the enforceability of voluntary industrial
arbitration agreements becomes apparent when one realizes the
widespread usage of arbitration clauses in industry-union collective
bargaining agreements. Conservative appraisals have shown that
three out of every four of the collectively bargained contracts opera-
tive today between labor and management contain some proviso
for the prospective arbitration of grievances and complaints. "In
recent years the prevailing pattern has made practically automatic
the acceptance of arbitration upon entering into contractual rela-
tions with a union."', "In the battle-scarred field of labor-manage-
ment relations, where practically every issue is bitterly contro-
versial, the principle of voluntary arbitration stands almost alone
2_Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 4426 (U.S.
May 4, 1948)
23 147 F 2d 869, 873 (App. D.C. 1945)
24r 162 F 2d 233, 235 (App. D.C. 1947) This opinion is especially notable
for its discussion of the public policy argument.25 Supra note 24, at 239.
2 6 Hurd v Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 16 U.S.L. Week 4432 (U.S. May
4, 1948)
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in having a virtual unanimity of acceptance.1 2 Behind this trend
has been the impetus of labor, management, and the public.
The current status of the Ohio law on this question has been
concisely stated m a recent Common Pleas opinion.3 A labor union
sought specific performance, by mandatory injunction, of arbitra-
tion provisions m a labor agreement between the union and a cor-
porate employer. The court in sustain the defendant employer's
demurrer to the petition held, that in the absence of a statute giv-
Ing jurisdiction to the court to decree specific performance of the
agreement to arbitrate, such relief must be denied. The court in-
dicated that contracts between employers and employees in respect
to the terms or conditions of employment are excluded by the pro-
visions of The Ohio Arbitration Act4 and cannot be specifically en-
forced prior to issuance of an award. No appeal was taken from
the decision.
The term "arbitration" is loosely applied *to all extra-judicial
determination of causes between parties m controversy2 The dic-
tionary broadly classifies arbitration into three groups: (A) inter-
national arbitration, between nations; (B) commercial arbitration,
between business men; and (C) iidustrial arbitration between
management and labor.' Each of these three general classifications
is subdivided into: "submission agreement," an agreement to sub-
mit an existing controversy; "arbitration clause," an agreement to
submit future controversies arising from an existing agreement.
Distinctions among these three species of arbitration were pri-
marily terminological and of limited practical significance until
passage of recent arbitration laws.7 At common law, the judicial
2 1bid. It is not the object of this note to discuss compulsory arbitra-
tion. "Compulsory arbitration is distinguished from voluntary arbitration by
the fact that the parties to a dispute are under statutory obligation to sub-
mit unresolved differences to settlement through the arbitral process. Em-
ployers and employees may be bound by outstanding labor contracts to refer
certain types of disputes to an arbitral board, but the arbitration is classi-
fied as voluntary so long as it results from an agreement freely entered into
by both sides, whether currently or in the past. Voluntary arbitration is
an accepted method of adjusting labor disputes, usually being urged on the
parties when conciliation and mediation have failed to bring about a
settlement." 2 PATCH, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, EDITORIAL RESEARCH RE-
PORTS 595 (1947)
3Utility Workers Union v Ohio Power Co., 49 Ohio L. Abs. 619 (Ct.
of C.P., Tuscarawas County 1948)
41OHIo GEN. CODE §§12148-1 to 12148-17.
5 WEBSTER, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 138 (2d ed. 1938)
6 Ibid. "The essence of arbitration is the passing of judgment by third
persons on a dispute between two parties at interest." 2 PATCH, COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 596 (1947)
7Phillips, The Function of Arbitration in the Settlement of Industrzal
Dzsputes, 33 COL. L. Rlv. 1366 .(1933)
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fiat was against enforcement of arbitration agreements regardless
of their classification. An agreement to arbitrate either an existing
dispute, or a future dispute, though not declared illegal, was never-
theless not specifically enforceable prior to the making of an award.
Nor would the courts compel the arbiter to act.8
Common law decisions further provided for a revocation of the
authority of the arbitrator, or of the agreement to submit, at any
period prior to the making of the award.0 "Only an award m final
form could bar the right to revoke the submission. This was true
even though the parties had an express covenant not to revoke,
because the parties could not make that irrevocable which was in
its nature revocable."1 0
The following reasons have been offered for refusal to give ef-
fect to arbitration agreements: because arbitration agreements
ousted courts from jurisdiction they were contrary to public
policy;" such clauses by nature were revocable; 2 arbitral processes
prevented legal action and needlessly restricted individual rights; 3
arbitrators at common law were without authority to administer
oaths or compel attendance of witnesses, and were therefore in-
competent completely and accurately to administer true justice.14
"It has been asserted and never denied that this hostility prob-
ably originated 'in the contests of courts of ancient times for ex-
tensions of jurisdiction - all of them being opposed to anything
that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction.' "',
"A more unworthy genesis cannot be imagined"'
6 but this judici1
antipathy to usurpation of court duties has survived to the present
to harass the enforcement of labor arbitration agreements. 7
8 Conner v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 166 (1853); Dayton and Union Ry. v.
P.C.C. and St.L. Ry., 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 537, 549 (1902), Shafer v. M.G.M.
Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N.E. 689 (1929), 3 Am. JuR. 906; 6 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §1919 (Rev. ed. 1938).
9 Tilden v. Bernard, 12 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 193 (1909), State v Jackson,
36 Olho St. 281, 284 (1880); Polk v. The Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317,
151 N.E. 808 (1925)
103 Oro Jum. 76.
"1 Baltimore and O.R.R. v. Stankard, 56 Ohio St. 224, 46 N.E. 577 (1897).
"2 See notes 10 and 11 supra.
3 See note 12 supra.
"Shafer v. M.G.M. Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N.E. 689 (1929).
156 W.LISTON, CONTRACTS §1919 n. 2 (Rev. ed. 1938) See opinion of
Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L.C. 811.
16 U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 22 Fed.
1006; Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 132 (1934)
"Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. 1089 (1900), Tilden v.
Bernard, 12 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 193, 21 Ohio C.D. 225 (1909).
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aaiobT4eosmgleroomomimawweriledy for a violation of an agreement
-&o, arlbitatefonsiatedyofh artactaon for damages for breach of the
a of proving any but nominal
-ages, :lsr~y~l~jas~pbviously inadequate. 9
Courts distinguished cases where compliance with the arbitra-
r]s.aQandition precedent to action on the prmci-
p-l conrat and _;he aeused to take jurisdiction unless and until
ithe cenditwn .precednt -were performed.2 0 But this relief was
limited to casesa o ?iditions precedent, which stipulated for the
ascertainment of certain preliminary or incidental matters, the
fetermmation of which was essential to the right of action on the
min contract. f the condition involved determinations of sub-
stantive liability, or if it provided for a waiver of the litigant's
right to seek court' redress, it was disregarded.2 1 Any attempt to
s'tipblate for tedetermination of the ultimate legal issue, the lia-
'bility ot:nonLiability of the parties, no matter its form, encountered
.thetraditional antagonism and was held void.
f-ti le--clise'miaking the award a condition precedent was not
16 Tht~iga and' spd ecific Part of the contract, it was construed as a
-eollaiteral- 6venaiit Eind, ot a bar to legal action on the primary
contract. CThis',eoncept~wis followed even where the action was
-broiught -without a prior- arbitration and award.2 2 Judicial reticence
-to) construe! a 3clause to be a condition precedent to the right to
-amtain an actiontmade-it an essential requirement that the word-
ing of the contractexpresslyide.clare the clause to be a condition.
Because of fhi{f&tuitilgbfJ'judicial opinion, many states passed
arbitration statutes ,spet-hIcbly authorizing and providing for the
specific performancd'o-frbitration clauses. Some passed in sub-
stance the provisions of the Draft State Arbitration Act.23 Other
states greatly modified this recommended legislation to suit special
needs. It is at this juncture that the nomenclature of the agreement
ceases to be academic and acquires important legal consequences.
Statutory distinctions are now drawn between commercial and in-
dustrial arbitration, between "submission agreements" and "arbi-
tration clauses." Seven states, including Ohio, have affirmatively
excluded labor disputes from the jurisdiction of their arbitration
18 3 Amvi. JUR. 904; See note, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 409 (1914), Utility Work-
ers Union v Ohio Power Co., 49 Ohio L. Abs. 619 (1948)
19 See note 18 supra.
20 Graham v German American Insurance Co., 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N.E.
930 (1907)
21 Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. 1089 (1900)
22Hamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890), Note, 94 A.L.R.
518 (1935)
2 Sponsored by the American Arbitration Association.
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statutes.24 "Submission agreements" are irrevocable and specifically
enforceable by statutes in all but two states.25 "Arbitration agree-
ments" are specifically enforceable in only thirteen states and under
Federal arbitration laws. 28
The Draft State Act was designed primarily to meet the neces-
sity of commercial arbitration,27 but industrial arbitration is in-
cluded within its provisions..2 8 Thus in the absence of specific statu-
tory exclusions, labor disputes arising under labor agreements pro-
viding for submission of the dispute to arbitration are within the
purview of the Draft State Act and are deemed specifically en-
forceable.29
Those states that have passed the Draft State Act, or similar
arbitration legislation, have tussled with the question of whether
industrial disputes are also to be covered by the Draft State Act.
The wisdom of such inclusion is questioned by some authorities
who point out that commercial arbitration has as its ultimate mo-
tive the substitution of the arbitrator for a court, whereas "...
industrial arbitration in any but interpretative cases provides a tri-
bunal for the settlement of fundamental disputes, for there is no
court in which such disputes can be settled.
0
In 1931, Ohio repealed its former arbitration statutes 31 and
substituted therefor substantially the provisions of the Draft State
21AMz. CODE §§ 27-301 to 27-311 (1939); MICH. STAT. §§ 27.2483 to
27.2505 (1936) as amended by Public Acts (1941) No. 182, and § 27.2505
(1); N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926), Ch. 358, as amended by laws 1929, Ch. 147,
§§ 1 to 10; OHio GEN. CODE §§ 12148-1 to 12148-17; ORE. COMp. LAWS AN.
§§ 11-601 to 11-613 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAws (1938) Ch. 475, §§ 1 to 17;
Wis. REV. STAT. §§ 298.01 to 298.18 (1939).
25 Oklahoma and South Dakota. In these two states submissions of
existing controversies are capable of specific performance without statute
provisions. 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPuTES AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAnING AGREE-
MENTS 540 (1940).
26Ariz., Cal., Conn., La., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Orb., Pa.,
R. I., Wis.
27Draft State Act, American Arbitration Association, New York.
Phillips, The Function of Arbitration in the Settlement of Industrial Dis-
putes, 33 COL. L. REv. 1367 (1933).
28 "The provisions of this Act shall apply to any arbitration agree-
ment between employers and employees or between employers and asso-
ciations of employees, unless such agreement specifically provides that it
shall not be subject to the provisions of this Act." Draft State Act, Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, New York, Section 1.
- Ibid.
306 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1930 (Rev. ed. 1938).
31 In 1931 Ohio enacted arbitration legislation which had the effect of
making the arbitration provision clause legal but did little else. The com-
mon law rules were still used in deciding arbitration questions. Columbus,
H. V. and T.R.R. v. Burke, 54 Ohio St. 98, 43 N. E. 282 (1896); Torrence
v. Amden, 2 Ohio Fed. Dec. 325, 24 Fed. Cas. 62 (1844).
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Arbitration Act.3 2 Under this new Ohio legislation, certain contracts
to arbitrate were declared directly enforceable by mandatory in-
junction decreeing specific performance; 3 indirectly enforce-
able by court order staying contractual actions brought in violation
of an agreement to arbitrate;34 and collaterally enforceable by court
order appointing arbitrators empowered to proceed with the arbi-
tration.33 This constituted a radical departure from previous com-
mon law principles.36
However, this Ohio act excludes collective or individual agree-
ments between employers and employees in respect to terms or con-
ditions of employment. 7 Ohio law therefore excludes industrial
arbitration from the statutory provision allowing specific perform-
ance of commercial arbitration clauses.
Under certain sections of the Ohio General Code,36 employers
and employees may voluntarily submit an existing controversy to
the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The Industrial Commission
has authority to hear the dispute and make a finding. This finding
is enforceable by court order, provided the parties to the contro-
versy have stipulated beforehand that the decision of the Com-
mission shall be binding.3 9
In no code provision can there be found statutes providing for
the enforceability of agreements for the arbitration of future labor
disputes. Since arbitration clauses in collective agreements in-
variably concern issues yet to arise, the present Ohio view as to
the enforceability of labor arbitration remains unchanged.
It is submitted that the law should provide a method of en-
forcement for industrial arbitration agreements which will be as
effective as those provided for the commercial counterpart. En-
forcement of commercial arbitration has been legislatively approved
as a method of avoiding the concomitant expense, technicality, in-
expediency, and undesirable bias, often created in a jury trial.
Arbitration in labor controversies is a flexible, orderly, and
established preventative substitute for industrial battle. It is not
hailed as an attempted cure. Arbitrative processes offers to con-
tractual participants a voluntary, satisfactory, and amicable pro-
32 OxIo GEN. CODE §12148-1 et seq.
s O3Io GEN. CODE §12148-3.
34 OHio GEx. CODE §12148-2.
3 5 OHio GEN. CODE §12148-4. American Laundry Machinery Co. v.
Prosperity Gas Co., 27 Ohio Op. 393 (1944).36The Ohio Code Sections provide for the three enforcement devices
recommended by The Draft State Act in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
37 OHIo GEN. CODE §12148-1.
as OHIo GEN. CODE §§871-12, 871-22.
a9 OHIo GEN. CODE §§1066, 1063, 1074.
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•cedure of adjudication of prospective discord where otherwise the
-dispute would be non:justiciable. Artifice should not be resorted to
to evade such provisions for evasion negates the goal of labor arbi-
tration if the proviso for arbitration becomes the threshold rather
than the conclusion of litigation.40 A great percentage of arbitration
clauses are carried to completion and the results accepted because
of the integrity of the parties concerned, and their mutual-respect
for a promise made. The auspicious record of the use of the arbi-
tration method in labor contracts, however successful, does not
.suture the incision of non-enforceability. As a consequence the
contractual provision for arbitration is left precariously balanced on
the caprice of the parties and its inclusion in the collective agree-
ment settles nothing. Its inclusion actually provides a means for
reopening the controversies supposedly settled in the bargaining
process instead of merely interpreting that which was bargained.
'Thus an agreement to arbitrate becomes an advantageous wedge to
prolong a dispute rather than to provide a mechanism for its settle-
nent.
Legislation is needed in Ohio if it-be desired to enforce labor
arbitration agreements, and until the legislature sees fit to modern-
ize legal thinking on this issue, voluntary collective labor agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes will remain ". . worthless
guarantees against the necessity for recourse to the traditional ju-
dicial process."'1
Robert L. Perdue
40 "Sometimes in voluntary arbitration the parties reserve the right
to reject the award of the arbitrators, but this is not the usual practice.
In fact there* is little point in resorting to arbitration unless the parties
agree in advance to accept the award." 2 PATCH, COWPULSORY ARBITP.RATION,
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 595 (1947).
- 1 TELLER, LABOR DiseUTsS AnD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
539 (1940).
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